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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Michael Douglas White timely appeals from the district court's order revoking
probation.

On appeal, Mr. White argues that the district court's decision to use a

magistrate's probable cause determination as the sole basis to support its finding that
Mr. White violated the terms of his probation by committing a new offense violated his
right to due process in two regards. First, he argues that the district court denied him
the right to confront witnesses. Second, he argues that the district court denied him due
process by lowering the State's evidentiary burden at the probation revocation l1earing.
Mr. White also argues that the district court's finding that he violated the terms

his

probation was clearly erroneous because it was not supported by substantial and
competent evidence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
While on misdemeanor probation, Mr. White decided to drink at a bar. (R., p.10.)
Mr. White was pulled over while driving home from the bar because he did not have a
rear license plate on his vehicle.

(R., p.10.) The police officer that pulled Mr. White

over was informed by dispatch that Mr. White was on misdemeanor probation.
(R., p.10.) The police officer noticed that Mr. White had bloodshot eyes and could smell
the odor of alcohol emanating from Mr. White's vehicle.

(R., p.10.) Mr. White failed

some field sobriety tests and was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol
(hereinafter, DUI). (R., pp.10-11.)

Mr. White was charged, by information, with DUI and a felony charging
enhancement based on two prior DUI convictions. (R., pp.43-44.) Pursuant to a plea

1

agreement, Mr. White pleaded guilty to felony DUI and, in return, the State agreed to
make a favorable sentencing recommendation. (R., pp.46, 49.) Thereafter, the district
court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction. (R., pp.61-64.) Upon review of Mr. White's period of retained jurisdiction
(hereinafter, rider), the district court suspended the sentence and placed him on

probation. (R., pp.71-76.)
While on probation, Mr. White was arrested for DUI and driving without
privileges. (R., pp.102-103.) Due to that arrest, Mr. White was charged, in a separate
criminal matter (hereinafter, New Case), with DUI, a felony charging enhancement, and
driving without privileges. (R., pp.116-117.) A preliminary hearing was held on these
new charges, and Mr. White was bound over on an enhanced felony DUI and driving
without privileges. (R., pp.116-117.)
Based on the charges in the New Case, the State also filed a report of probation
violation, in this case, alleging that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation.
(R., pp.102-103.) Prior to the evidentiary hearing on the probation violations, the State

moved the district court to take judicial notice of the magistrate's probable cause
determination in the New Case. (R., pp.116-117.)
At the evidentiary hearing, the State argued that the only evidence needed to
satisfy its burden of proof as to the alleged probation violations was the magistrate's
probable cause determination from the preliminary hearing in the New Case. (Tr., p.3,
Ls.15-24.) Mr. White objected to this procedure and argued that he had a due process
right to a full revocation hearing, which required the State to elicit testimony from actual
witnesses. (Tr., p.4, Ls.5-9.) Mr. White also argued that the only evidence proffered at
the preliminary hearing in regard to the driving without privileges charge was the
2

arresting officer's citation.

(Tr., p.4, Ls.11-15.)

Mr. White then argued that he was

denied the right to confront witnesses as to the alleged probation violations. 1 (Tr., p.5,
L.15 - p.7, L.22.)
The district court then ruled, pursuant to State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762 (2007),
that there is a "markedly restricted" right to confront witnesses at a probation revocation
hearing and denial of that right is constitutional as long as there is a "reliability
determination" as to the evidence and a determination as to "whether the prior process
has the earmarks of reliability."

(Tr., p.8, Ls.17-23.)

The district court then ruled,

"based on the minutes of the February 21, 2014," preliminary hearing and the order
binding Mr. White over to the district court, that the State had met its evidentiary burden
as to the DUI probation violation. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-6.) However, the district court ruled
that the State failed to meet its burden of proof as to driving without privileges allegation
because the arresting officer's citation was the only evidence adduced at the preliminary
hearing as to that charge. (Tr., p.9, L.5 - p.10, L.5.)
After finding that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation, it revoked
probation and retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.121-123.)

Mr. White timely appealed.

(R., pp.126-127.)

1

Mr. White's defense counsel initially appeared to be somewhat equivocal as to the
assertion of a right to confront witnesses in regard to the alleged DUI probation violation
because defense counsel recognized that Mr. White did have the ability to confront the
State's witness at the preliminary hearing in the New Case. (Tr., p.5, L.25 - p.7, L.5.)
However, the district court asked a clarification question and defense counsel
unequivocally asserted that Mr. White desired to exercise his right to confront witnesses
as to the alleged DUI probation violation. (Tr., p.7, Ls.6-22.)
3

ISSUES
1)
the

2)

the district court violate Mr. White's right to due
to confront
and lowered the
probation evidentiary hearing?

when it denied him

Is the district court's finding, that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation,
clearly erroneous?

4

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Violated Mr. White's Right To Due Process When It Denied Him The
Right To Confront Witnesses And Lowered The State's Evidentiary Burden During The
Probation Evidentiary Hearing

A.

Introduction
Probationers have a due process right to basic procedures during probation

revocation proceedings.

One of those procedural rights is the ability to confront

witnesses. However, this right is not absolute and can be denied in the event the State
establishes good cause for its failure to produce witnesses. In order to establish good
the district court and the

must engage in a three-step process. First, the

State must provide a good reason to justify its failure to produce witnesses. Second,
the State must establish that the evidence which is being submitted in lieu of live
testimony bears earmarks of reliability. The third and final step is the requirement that
the district court weigh the State's interest in failing to produce witnesses against the
probationer's right to confront witnesses. In this case, the district court erred because
the State did not provide any justification for failing to produce witnesses, and, due to
that error, the district court was not able to weigh the State's interest in failing to
produce witnesses against Mr. White's right to confront witnesses.
Mr. White also argues that his right to due process was violated because the
district court's reliance on the magistrate's probable cause determination lowered the
State's burden of proof at the probation revocation hearing. A preponderance of the
evidence standard, which requires a higher level of proof than a probable cause
determination, is used to determine whether a term of probation was violated. It follows
that the district court's sole reliance on a magistrate's probable cause determination had
5

functional effect

lowering the

of

hearing from a preponderance of the

B.

the probation

a probable cause.

Standard Of Review
The determination of whether a district court adhered to constitutional

requirements during probation violation proceedings constitutes a question of law over
which Idaho appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 765
(2007). Idaho appellate courts defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are
not supported by substantial and competent evidence and are, therefore, clearly
erroneous. State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679,

C.

{2004).

The District Court Violated Mr. White's Right To Due Process When It Denied
Him The Right To Confront Witnesses
The minimal due process protections which are required during parole and

probation revocation proceedings were set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).

In Morrissey, a case dealing

with parolees,2 the United States Supreme Court held that revocation of parole entailed
the loss of a liberty interest.

Morrisey, 408 U.S. at 482.

Since the loss of a liberty

interest was at stake, the Court went on to hold that due process entitles parolees to
some formal process before parole can be revoked.

Id. at 485. The United State's

Supreme Court then held that this process includes "the right to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for
not allowing confrontation)." Id. at 489.

Gagnon extended the holdings from Morrissey to probationers and, as such, the same
conditions applicable to parole revocation proceedings are applicable to probation
revocation proceedings. State v. Scraggins, 292 Idaho 867, 871 (2012).

2

6

The right to confront witnesses at a probation revocation hearing is not an
absolute right and is not co-extensive with a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to confront witnesses at a jury trial.

Rose, 144 Idaho at 766-767.

As such,

probationer's have a limited due process right to confront witnesses which can be
denied in the event the district court makes a "specific finding of good cause." Id. at
768.

Mr. White argues that the denial of his right to confront witnesses did not comport

with due process because the State never provided any cause, let alone, good cause
for its failure to produce witnesses, and, due to that error, the district court engaged in
an erroneous good cause analysis.
"In analyzing whether the defendant's right to confrontation was violated, courts
employ a process of balancing the defendant's right to confrontation against the state's
good cause for denying it." State v. Farmer, 131 Idaho 803, 806 (Ct. App. 1998) In
determining whether good cause exists, courts first look to the reason why the State has
failed to produce witnesses, such as any difficulty and expense involved in procuring
witnesses. Farmer, 131 Idaho at 807. In Morrissey, the United States Supreme Court
held that good cause could be found if the witness "would be subject to risk of harm if
his identity were disclosed." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487. In Young v. United States,
863 A.2d 804, 808 (D.C. 2004 ), good cause was found when a witnesses invoked the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. After the district court has found
that the State provided a legitimate reason for failing to produce witnesses, the district
court must then determine if the evidence which is being proffered in lieu of live
testimony bears some indicia of reliability.

Farmer, 131 Idaho at 807.

Finally, the

State's reason for not producing witnesses and the reliability of the substitute evidence
must be balanced against the probationer's "right to confrontation under the specific
7

in that case."

circu
which must

conducted in order

131 Idaho at 807. This is a
a trial court's

cause

inquiry
to be

upheld on appeal. Id. at 807 n.4.
In this case, the district court's good cause analysis was flawed because the
State did not provide a reason why it failed to produce witnesses to testify at Mr. White's
evidentiary hearing. At the beginning of that hearing, the district court asked the State if
it was ready to call its first witness (Tr., p.3, Ls.13-14) and the State responded as
follows:
Your Honor, the State filed a motion that was signed March 13th, 2014,
and I believe filed March 14th, requesting that the Court take judicial
notice of Case CR-13-24814 wherein I understand Mr. White was subject
to [a] preliminary hearing, and at that preliminary hearing probable cause
was found on the circumstances which underlie the allegations in the
relevant probation violation, so Your Honor, it's the State's intent to rely on
that motion that the Court take judicial notice.
(Tr., p.3, Ls.15-24.)
Mr. White objected and asserted a "due process right to have an evidentiary
hearing on a probation violation, and to take testimony, and to have this court decide
those issues." (Tr., p.4, Ls.5-9.) After lodging those objections, the following dialogue
occurred:
THE COURT:
Do you have any case law to support . . . [the
asserted right to confrontation].

MR. PHELPS:l3l
There's Supreme Court case law that says that
defendants have a right of confrontation in a probation violation hearing
and the U.S. Supreme Court case law says you have minimal due process
rights to confrontation in a probation violation hearing.

3

Mr. Phelps represented Mr. White at the evidentiary hearing.
8

THE COURT:
State v. Rose is what I've always gone by, and it
says that it is very markedly restricted as long as there's a reliability
determination that's been made and whether the prior process has the
earmarks of reliability, and that cites to . . . Young v. United States. Is
there any other authority that the defense has?
MR. PHELPS:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:
Well, I find that allegation one has been proven as it
pertains to driving under the influence and that that was willful based on
the minutes of the February 21st, 2014, hearing, the order holding or the
bindover order that was signed that same day ....
(Tr., p.7, L.23 - p.9, L.5.)
The district court's reliability determination alone did not establish good cause to
deny Mr. White the right to confront witnesses. The State failed to assert any reasons
as to why it was particularly onerous to produce witnesses and, due to that failure, the
district court did not make any factual findings as to the State's difficulty in producing
witness.

As mentioned above, the district court must evaluate why the State is not

providing a witness before it determines whether the proffered evidence bears indicia of
reliability. Farmer, 131 Idaho at 807. As mentioned above, courts have suggested that
a risk of harm to the witness, the invocation of a testimonial privilege, significant
expense, and other significant difficulty could be the basis for finding good cause.
However, no such justification was provided in this case.
Additionally, a review of the record on appeal leads to the conclusion that it
would have been relatively easy for the State to provide a witness at Mr. White's
probation evidentiary hearing. The witness at issue was a local police officer, Daniel
Koontz, employed by the Spirit Lake police department. (See generally 02/21/14 Tr.)4

4

This is a citation to the minutes of the February 21, 2014, preliminary hearing in the
New Case. As mentioned above, the district court took judicial notice of these minutes
at Mr. White's probation revocation hearing. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-5.) However, the minutes of
9

Officer Koontz was available to provide testimony before the magistrate in the New
Case approximately six few weeks prior to the probation evidentiary hearing. (Tr., p.9,
Ls.1-5; see generally 02/21/14 Tr.) There is no evidence that Officer Koontz had left the
area or was otherwise unavailable to testify at Mr. White's probation evidentiary hearing.
Since Officer Koontz testified at the preliminary hearing, there is no reason such as
safety or the invocation of an evidentiary privilege, which would explain why he was
unwilling to testify at Mr. White's probation revocation hearing.

Mr. White cannot

fathom any legitimate reason why a local police officer could not be made available to
testify at Mr. White's probation revocation hearing. In fact, the Idaho Court of Appeals
has held that, "Where, such as in this case, the state's principal witness is a local
probation or police officer, it should pose no great burden upon the state to hold a
Morrissey hearing .... " Gawron v. Roberts, 113 Idaho 330, 337 (Ct. App. 1987).
Since the State failed to provide any reason why Officer Koontz was unavailable
to testify, the district court was unable to make requisite factual findings as to that issue,
which also prevented the district court from conducting the mandatory balancing of
State's interest against Mr. White's right to confront witnesses. As the Idaho Supreme
Court held in Rose, supra, this is a mandatory analysis which requires a specific finding
of good cause tailored to the facts of each case. Rose, 144 Idaho at 768.
In order to find good cause to deny a probationer the right to confront witnesses,
the district court must find some reason justifying the State's failure to produce
witnesses. The State's proffered reason must be legitimate, such as potential harm to a
witness, the invocation of an evidentiary privilege, significant expense, or some other

this hearing were not included in the record on appeal.
augment has been filed concurrently herewith.
10

Accordingly a motion to

difficulty in producing witnesses.
court then determine whether the
has

after

finding

been made

evidence proffered by the State

earmarks of reliability. After the reliability determination has been made, the

district court must then weigh the State's interest in failing to produce witnesses against
the probationer's right to confront witnesses.

In this case, the district court only

determined that the State's alternative to live testimony was reliable.

However, the

State provided no reason why Officer Koontz was unavailable to testify at Mr. White's
revocation hearing, and the district court made no factual findings indicating Officer
Koontz was unavailable to testify. Due to that failure, the district court never engaged in
the mandatory balancing of the State's interests versus Mr. White's right to confront
witnesses.

D.

The District Court Violated Mr. White's Right To Due Process When It Lowered
The State's Evidentiary Burden During The Guilt Phase Of The Probation
Revocation Hearing
The district court violated Mr. White's to due process when it lowered the State's

burden from a preponderance standard to a probable cause standard. As mentioned in
Section l(C), supra, the United State's Supreme Court has held that due process
requires the adherence to formal procedures prior to the revocation of probation. See
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485; see also Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782.

Accordingly, the

Morrissey Court held that a parolee is entitled to two parole revocation hearings. Id. at
485. The first hearing is in the nature of a preliminary hearing, which is conducted by a
neutral officer charged with the determination of whether there is probable cause to
believe the parolee violated a term of his/her parole agreement. Id.
The second hearing is a final, more extensive, hearing wherein the court must
determine whether a violation occurred, and, if so, whether parole should be revoked.

11

Id.

'This

cause; it

lead

for more than determining probable
final evaluation of any contested

and

consideration of whether the facts as determined warrant revocation." Id. at 488.
addition to the foregoing procedu

In

the Morrissey Court held that the following

conditions must be met at the final revocation hearing:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and
to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral
and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members
of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking parole.
Id. at 489.

At the final probation evidentiary hearing, the State has the burden to prove the
existence of the alleged probation violation. Rose, 144 Idaho at 765. It follows that, the
State must prove, under a preponderance of the evidence, that the probationer violated
the terms of his/her probation. See I.C. § 20-229B (providing that a preponderance of
the evidence standard is applicable at parole revocation proceedings); see also State v.
Scraggins, 292 Idaho 867, 871 (2012) (holding that a probationer, like a parolee, is

entitled to a preliminary and a final evidentiary hearing, under the same conditions
applicable to the revocation of parole; thus, the State must provide the same process
when terminating a probationer from probation as it does when revoking a parolee's
parole).
At a preliminary hearing, during the initial phases of a criminal action, the State
must only prove that a crime was committed and that there is probable cause to believe
the defendant committed the crime.

State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 84 (1989).

12

"The

probable-cause standard is less than a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Neal,
155 Idaho 484, 487 (2013). A due process violation occurs when the State's evidentiary
burden has been artificially lowered by its own actions or actions of the court.

See

State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685-686 (Ct. App. 2010).
Based on the foregoing, Mr. White argues that his right to due process was
violated when the district court revoked his probation based on a different judge's
determination made under a lower evidentiary standard than a preponderance of the
evidence. Or in other words, the district court's procedure reduced the State's burden
of proof from the higher preponderance of the evidence standard to the lesser probable
cause standard.
Support for Mr. White's argument can be found in Brandt v. Idaho Comm'n for
Pardons and Parole, 135 Idaho 208 (Ct. App. 2000). In that case, Brandt was on parole
when he was arrested for committing a misdemeanor offense. Id. at 209. Brandt was
then served with a "parole violation" for consuming alcohol and another "parole
violation" for the new misdemeanor charge. Id. A probable cause hearing was held in
the misdemeanor case and a magistrate found probable cause existed for the
misdemeanor offense. Id. Brandt remained in jail because of the outstanding parole
violations and, in the interim, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "alleging that
his due process rights had been violated because he had not been given a hearing to
determine whether there was probable cause to believe" he violated his parole. Id. The
petition was denied because the court found that the "misdemeanor probable cause
hearing satisfied Brandt's right to a hearing to determine the existence of probable
cause for a parole violation warrant." Id.

13

Brandt appealed and argued that the foregoing procedure did not comport with
the basic due process protections set for in Morrissey.

Id. at 209-210. Specifically,

Brandt argued "that the magistrate erred in holding that the probable cause hearing
conducted on the misdemeanor charge was the equivalent of the preliminary
prerevocation hearing described in Morrissey." Id. at 210. The Court of Appeals held
that the magistrate erred because "the procedures for a probable cause determination
in a misdemeanor case do not include the procedural safeguards mandated by
Morrissey." Id. at 210-211. 5 In distinguishing between the two hearings, the Court of

Appeals explained that misdemeanor probable cause hearings are exparte and there is
no right to confront witnesses. Id. In light of Brandt, the district court erred in this matter
because it relied on the magistrate's probable cause determination when the standard
at the final revocation hearing is a higher preponderance of the evidence standard.
In sum, the district court's reliance on the magistrate's probable cause
determination did not comport with the procedural safeguards set forth in Morrissey,
because at the final revocation hearing there "must be the basis for more than
determining probable cause; it must lead to a final evaluation of any contested facts ...
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487-488.

Therefore, the district court's ruling violated

There are various jurisdictions which have held that the varying probable cause
determinations which generally occur during the initial criminal proceedings cannot
replace the final probation evidentiary hearing mandated by Morrissey. See, e.g., In re
A. W., 353 A.2d. 686, 691-692 (D.C. 1976) ("[T]he finding of probable cause at the
preliminary hearing with respect to the defendant's current charges does not constitute
sufficient foundation, without more, for revocation of a defendant's probation.");
Figures v. State, 920 N.E.2d 267, 272-272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that evidence of
an arrest and a finding of probable cause does not warrant the revocation of probation);
State v. Scholberg, 393 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the
revocation of probation was improper when the basis for revocation was the existence
of allegations that the probationer committed a new offense and the mere fact the
probationer waived a preliminary hearing).
5
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Mr. White's due process rights because it lowered the State's evidentiary burden from
preponderance of the evidence to probable cause.

II.
The District Court's Finding, That Mr. White Violated The Terms Of His Probation, Is
Clearly Erroneous
In the event this Court determines that the district court's procedures at the
probation revocation hearing did not violate Mr. White's due process rights, he argues,
in the alternative, that the district court's finding that Mr. White violated the terms of his
probation was clearly erroneous because there was no evidence to support that finding.
Idaho appellate courts defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are not
supported by substantial and competent evidence and are, therefore, clearly erroneous.

Hoyle, 140 Idaho at 682.
When a defendant appeals from an order revoking probation, the Idaho Court of
Appeals employs the following analytical framework:
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence
is within the discretion of the district court. I.C. § 20-222. In a probation
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct. App. 1987).

State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct. App. 1989). "The finding of a probation
violation must be on verified facts .... " Rose, 144 Idaho at 765.
The State alleged that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation for driving
without privileges and DUI.

(R., pp.102-103.) At the evidentiary hearing, the district

court found that the State failed to establish that Mr. White was driving without
privileges. (Tr., p.9, L.5 - p.10, L.5.) However, the district court found that Mr. White
violated the terms of his probation by committing the offense of DUI. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-5,
15

1

)
minutes of

materials submitted by the
preliminary hearing

in support of

finding were

the order binding Mr. White over to

district court. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-5.) Mr. White argued that there was nothing in the record to
support a factual finding that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation because the
State failed to "offer a transcript or any evidence for [the court] to evaluate
independently." (Tr., p.4, Ls.9-10.)
On appeal, Mr. White continues to assert that the minutes of the magistrate's
preliminary hearing alone are not enough to independently establish the fact that
Mr. White violated the terms of his probation. As mentioned in Section 1(0), supra, at a
preliminary hearing, the State must only prove that a crime was committed and that
there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crime. Fain, 116 Idaho
at 84. The specific term of probation Mr. White allegedly violated was the requirement
that he "commit no violations of any law of ... of any state .... " (R., p.102.) Mr. White
submits that a probable cause determination and minutes of the preliminary hearing are
not evidence and are not enough to establish, under the preponderance of the
evidence, that Mr. White did in fact commit a new offense. Absent a transcript of that
hearing, there was nothing that the district court could evaluate to make the requisite
factual findings that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation agreement.
As such, the district court's factual findings that Mr. White violated the terms of
his probation are clearly erroneous because they are not supported by substantial and
competent evidence.
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